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Abstract 
This comment seeks to provide a conceptual framework for analysing the Banking Union’s 
implications for private law. After discussing how and in what form the Banking Union can engender 
potentially relevant regulatory norms, it identifies the general ways whereby these can be recognised 
in private law and translated into private rights and/or duties. It then responds to a common argument 
against translation, namely, that the public nature of the regulatory regime’s goals and concerns 
hinders its normative expansion in the realm of private law. On a more practical level, it provides a 
tentative catalogue of private legal relations likely to be affected by the Banking Union. 
Keywords 
Banking Union, SSM, SRM, EBA, Banking regulation, Single rulebook, Private remedies, Regulatory 
duties, Civil liability. 
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1. Introduction* 
The debate on the interaction between governmental and business actors, and between norms of public 
and private law, in the field of financial regulation may not be exhaustive, but it is not new either.
1
 
Many of the existing contributions focus on the role of collective private organisations or lobbies in 
the development of public or publicly enforced standards of financial behaviour
2
 or, more generally, 
on the ways in which such private organisations participate in regulatory regimes.
3
 In a thoughtful and 
topical essay,
4
 Stefan Grundmann moves in another direction. He contemplates the likely impact of the 
euro area’s nascent Banking Union ‒ that is, of a regulatory regime of supranational and public 
character ‒ on private law and private relationships. Thus, following a concise discussion of the 
Banking Union’s institutional construction, Grundmann asks whether, in view of their goals and 
method of enforcement, its regulatory norms can and should be translated into norms of private law, 
shaping private rights and duties. He then identifies specific areas of private law where such 
translation might be expected to take place.  
This comment seeks to provide a conceptual framework for analysing the Banking Union’s 
implications for private law. After discussing how and in what form the Banking Union can engender 
potentially relevant regulatory norms (Section 2), it identifies the general ways whereby these can be 
recognised in private law and translated into private rights and/or duties (Section 3). It then responds 
to a common argument against translation, namely, that the public nature of the regulatory regime’s 
goals and concerns hinders its normative expansion in the realm of private law (Section 4). On a more 
practical level, it provides a tentative catalogue of private legal relations likely to be affected by the 
Banking Union (Section 5).  
2. Regulatory Law of the Banking Union  
In a nutshell, the Banking Union is a streamlined and highly centralised regime for the supervision and 
resolution of banks in the euro area (and potentially beyond it, since non-euro area Member States can 
join in on a voluntary basis), based on a novel, complex and tiered institutional set-up.
5
 Although it 
reserves specific operational roles for national supervisors and resolution officials, for the truly critical 
decisions it relies on supranational decision-making, especially with regard to the largest and most 
systemically important credit institutions. Its two-pronged institutional construction comprises a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a separate Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).  
The SSM is an integrated organisational framework for banks’ prudential supervision (but not for 
conduct-of-business and/or consumer-related regulation).
6
 It is founded on two legal instruments: a 
Regulation on the organisation and procedures of the SSM itself (SSM Regulation),
7
 establishing the 
ECB’s role as the Banking Union’s ultimate supervisory authority; and an accompanying instrument, 
which amended the legal framework of the European Banking Authority (EBA) for the purpose of 
ensuring a balance between the countries of the Banking Union and the non-participating Member 
                                                     
*
 The author thanks Jens-Hinrich Binder, Jenny Giotaki and Vassilios Tountopoulos for valuable observations. 
1
 E.g., Norton (2003); Gorton (2003).  
2
 E.g., Faerman et al. (2001).  
3
 E.g., Mosley (2009); Cafaggi (2011); Backer (2011); Pagliari (2012).  
4
 Grundmann (2015).  
5
 For an initial overall assessment, see Moloney (2014a).  
6
 See Gortsos (2015).  
7
 Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, OJ 2013 L 287/63. 
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States in the EBA’s decision-making procedures.8 Within the SSM, the ECB is entrusted with direct 
supervisory responsibility for large, systemically important credit institutions. With regard to ‘less 
significant’ credit institutions, the ECB is responsible for their authorisation as well as for the vetting 
of major changes in the shareholder structure; the ongoing supervision is normally left to the national 
supervisory authorities on a home-country basis,
9
 although there are reserve powers whereby the ECB 
can take over the relevant tasks as well. The ECB is also responsible for the overall coordination, by 
means of regulations, guidelines or general instructions, of the national supervisory policies.  
The ECB’s competence extends to the adoption of appropriate corrective measures when a bank 
under its direct supervisory responsibility has crossed the threshold for early intervention.
10
 If, 
however, a bank is found to be not merely weak, but non-viable, its resolution will be carried out by 
the Banking Union’s second mechanism, the SRM.11 The SRM includes centralised decision-making 
procedures for the resolution of ECB-supervised banks, supported by common financial arrangements 
in the form of a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) (but not by common deposit guarantee arrangements, 
since the system of separate national DGSs has been retained). The operation of the SRM is based on a 
Regulation establishing a Single Resolution Board (SRB) as the central resolution authority and 
setting out the decision-making procedures for resolution (SRM Regulation).
12
  
Significantly, both mechanisms will apply, in their respective fields, the relevant norms of the pan-
European ‘single rulebook’. The single rulebook was not designed with specific reference to the euro 
area or the Banking Union. In fact, both the concept and the expression clearly predate the Banking 
Union project: the European Council called for the establishment of a ‘European single rule book 
applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market’ as early as June 2009;13 and much of the 
legislative work on the rulebook’s key components had already been done before the summer of 2012, 
when the Spanish crisis triggered the move to a Banking Union. Moreover, the single rulebook applies 
uniformly in all EU Member States (and in the three other countries of the EEA, once the EEA Joint 
Committee amends the EEA Agreement for the purpose of extending the applicability of the relevant 
instruments to them), even though specific differentiations are possible on matters relating primarily to 
the operation of the monetary union and its economy, rather than the single market. Nonetheless, the 
single rulebook was retrospectively identified as one of the foundational elements of the Banking 
Union, alongside the SSM and the SRM.  
The single rulebook includes a fully harmonised prudential framework for credit institutions which 
are still going concerns, as well as norms establishing a structured approach for the recovery of 
problem banks and the resolution of non-viable or failed ones. The prudential framework takes the 
form of two basic instruments, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)
14
 and the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR),
15
 both of which were adopted according to the ordinary legislative 
procedure, and a very large number of accompanying delegated and implementing acts, whose 
preparation is entrusted to the EBA and their final adoption to the Commission. Issues relating to 
supervisory interventions in weak banks and, particularly, to the resolution of failed ones are governed 
by another basic instrument, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD),
16
 which is also 
supported by numerous secondary measures.  
                                                     
8
 Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013, OJ 2013 L 287/5.  
9
 SSM Regulation, Art. 6. 
10
 Directive 2014/59/EU, OJ 2014 L 173/190 (BRRD), Arts. 27-30; and SRM Regulation, Art. 13. 
11
 For a concise description, see European Commission (2014).  
12
 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, OJ 2014 L 225/1.  
13
 European Council Conclusions, 19 June 2009. See also European Council Conclusions, 18 October 2012.  
14
 Directive 2013/36/EU, OJ 2013 L 176/338.  
15
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, OJ 2013 L 176/1.  
16
 Directive 2014/59/EU, OJ 2014 L 173/190.  
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Given that ‘single rulebook’ is a moniker, rather than a term of art,17 one could use it to describe 
solely the European regulatory norms of an essentially prudential nature, that is, those aiming at risk 
avoidance or risk containment at the level of the individual bank, as well as at systemic stability at the 
macro level.
18
 In this central sense, the rulebook would include the aforementioned and certain closely 
related instruments, such as the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive,
19
 the Financial Conglomerates 
Directive
20
 and the Electronic Money Directive.
21
 However, one could also use the expression to 
describe the entire corpus of harmonised rules of European banking law.
22
 The latter sense is more 
consistent with the EBA’s mandate, which encompasses regulatory functions both in the prudential 
field and in the field of transactional and conduct-of-business regulation.
23
 This would bring into the 
picture those instruments of European law which are directly and primarily concerned with banking 
transactions, such as the Payment Services Directive,
24
 the Consumer Credit Directive,
25
 the Mortgage 
Credit Directive,
26
 the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services Directive,
27
 the Third 
Money Laundering Directive,
28
 or the provisions in MiFID II
29
 setting out conduct-of-business 
obligations for financial intermediaries, including credit institutions, offering investment services to 
their clients.  
We can thus distinguish between three aspects of the emerging legal and regulatory regime: (a) the 
norms setting up the institutional framework of the SSM and the SRM and governing their operation; 
(b) the core of the single rulebook, which encompasses norms of essentially prudential intent; and (c) 
the penumbra of the single rulebook, covering norms primarily directed at banking transactions and 
market activities and the quality of banks’ relationships with their clients and counterparties. The 
norms in the first category are constitutive of the Banking Union and applicable only within its 
geographic limits. Their content is primarily organisational and procedural, rather than substantive. As 
such, they can have only limited, if any, resonance in private law. In contrast, the single rulebook 
(whose legal effect goes beyond the Banking Union, as already explained) contains substantive norms, 
which can potentially be of considerable significance for private law. From this perspective, however, 
there is an evident difference between the prudential core and the transactional penumbra. Despite 
their extensive reliance on administrative tools,
 
the non-prudential instruments are specifically 
designed to shape the contractual behaviour of credit institutions and their individual relationships 
with clients; they are thus indelibly linked to matters of private law. A similar linkage to private-law 
matters can only occasionally be observed in the prudential instruments. 
                                                     
17
 The term ‘single rulebook’ is used twenty times in the preambles to the various instruments setting up the Banking Union 
or establishing the Union’s basic prudential framework for credit institutions, but not once in their operative provisions; 
SSM Regulation, Rec. (7), (11)-(12), (30)-(32), (87); Regulation 1022/2013, Rec. (2), (4), (7), (11); SRM Regulation, 
Rec. (5), (7), (11), (35); CRD IV, Rec. (9)-(10); and CRR, Rec. 14. In most cases, the reference is simply to the ‘single 
rulebook for financial services in the Union’, without further explanation.  
18
 Thus SRM Regulation, Rec. (11).  
19
 Directive 2014/49/EU, OJ 2014 L 173/149.  
20
 Directive 2002/87/EC, OJ 2003 L 35/1.  
21
 Directive 2009/110/EC, OJ 2009 L 267/7.  
22
 This is the meaning implied in the references to a single rulebook in SSM Regulation, Rec. (31), SRM Regulation, Rec. 
(35), CRD IV, Rec. (10) and CRR, Rec. (14). Similar references can be found in the earlier instrument setting up the 
EBA, Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ 2010 L 331/12 (Regulation establishing the EBA), Rec. (5), (22).  
23
 Regulation establishing the EBA, Art. 1(2)-(3) and (5), as amended.  
24
 Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ 2007 L 319/1.  
25
 Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ 2008 L 133/66.  
26
 Directive 2014/17/EU, OJ 2014 L 60/34.  
27
 Directive 2002/65/EC, OJ 2002 L 271/16.  
28
 Directive 2005/60/EC, OJ 2005 L 309/15.  
29
 Directive 2014/65/EU, OJ 2014 L 173/349.  
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Since the precise effect of regulatory rules on market practice frequently depends on the approach 
and interpretations of their administrative enforcers, it may be expected that the intensity and 
uniformity of the single rulebook’s impact on private behaviour will increase as the banking 
supervisory methodologies and practices converge at the European level. In this context, the 
establishment by the EBA of common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices
30
 and the 
development of a supervisory handbook, aimed at ensuring cross-national consistency of the 
supervisory work by standardising methodologies and processes,
31
 may also contribute to imprinting 
the European regulatory choices on banks’ commercial behaviour and business organisation in a more 
stable and visible way, thus further shaping standard private practice. In particular, the supervisory 
handbook, despite its non-binding and confidential character, can exercise a strong influence in the 
direction of a unified supervisory approach, both in the prudential area and in connection to consumer 
protection.
32
 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how this facet of the EBA’s work, which is supposed 
to be of pan-European relevance, will be coordinated with the ECB’s own power to adopt regulations, 
guidelines and recommendations for the purpose of organising the SSM’s supervisory work within the 
narrower, but more coherent regulatory space of the Banking Union.
33
  
3. Regulatory Norms As Private Obligations  
It is evident that the financial sector’s need to comply with its regulatory obligations exercises a strong 
influence on the development of private practice. Depending on the case, both prudential and 
transactions-orientated provisions are bound to influence the behaviour of the private parties at which 
they are directed and to shape the banks’ internal organisation, common market arrangements and 
contractual relations with individual clients. This structuring influence of compliance does not require 
that the relevant regulatory duties be translated into private rights or duties and enforced in private 
law. The direct reflection of the regulatory duties in private law, however, is also possible. This can be 
highly significant for the overall dynamics of enforcement of the rules as well as for the situation of 
particular parties in case of breach.  
One should distinguish clearly between the two levels at which particular regulatory norms may be 
converted into private obligations and private rights of action: the norms’ private enforceability may 
be required by European law; alternatively, the private effects of the norms may be recognised merely 
at the national level, that is, in the domestic legislation or in the jurisprudence of individual Member 
States. 
 
For historical, political and practical reasons, in most cases the instruments of European law 
regulating economic activities are perceived as falling within the field of public economic law, not 
private law; they often include requirements regarding their implementation through national 
administrative measures, but remain silent about their private-law implications.
34
 In an increasing 
number of cases, however, the legislative texts include provisions on private rights of action. This 
applies, for instance, to violations of provisions protecting consumers of goods and services.
35
 Another 
conspicuous example is competition law, where, after decades of exclusive insistence on public 
enforcement, European law currently not only mandates that private actions for damages for breaches 
                                                     
30
 Regulation establishing the EBA, as amended, Art. 8(1)(a). 
31
 Ibid, Art. 8(1)(aa) and 29(2).  
32
 Regulation 1022/2013, Rec. (7).  
33
 SSM Regulation, Art. 4(3), second sub-para.; cf. CRD IV, Rec. (9), (10). 
34
 See, e.g., Cafaggi and Muir Watt (2009); Reich (2010).  
35
 See, e.g., Directive 85/374/EEC, OJ 1985 L 210/29, on liability for defective products; Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ 2009 L 
110/30, on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests; Directive 2011/83/EU, OJ 2011 L 304/64, on consumer 
rights; and (in untypical legal form) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, OJ 2004 L 46/1, on compensation and assistance to 
airline passengers.  
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of the relevant rules be available under national law, but goes on to harmonise most aspects of the 
applicable civil liability regime.
36
 Private rights and remedies may also be recognised in secondary 
instruments of European law (directives and regulations) in less developed form, through provisions 
framed in general terms, asserting the principle of private actionability without going into details,
37
 
and perhaps even implicitly, through mere references to the resolution of private disputes. Finally, the 
availability of private remedies for breaches of European law may be recognised judicially by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) when interpreting the relevant instruments.
38
  
In national law, the private enforcement of a European regulatory norm may be established by 
legislative fiat, as an express complement to the administrative or criminal system of enforcement. 
Alternatively, the courts may recognise the breach of the norm as a self-standing cause of action (such 
as civil liability for breach of statutory duty or a mandatory rule of law) or, where this is not possible, 
reinterpret the general standards of civil liability in line with the substantive duty established in 
regulatory law.
39
 In all cases, parallel public and private proceedings for one and the same case of 
misconduct, as defined in public law, will be possible.  
The cognisance of a regulatory duty in private law will generally serve to extend the liability of the 
duty holder; but in certain cases it may operate to restrict it, or to give it a concrete content, by 
confining the applicable general behavioural standards (whose precise content would otherwise be 
ascertainable only ex post and on the basis of the facts of the case) to the more specific, and possibly 
more formal and procedural, requirement of public law.
40
 In this manner, compliance with the 
regulatory norm may provide an effective safe harbour against more demanding interpretations of the 
same standards. This indirect restrictive result will be more likely to affect national litigation when the 
cause of action is recognised in uniform terms in European law. In rare cases, European law may even 
exclude liability altogether in circumstances where a remedy would otherwise be available in national 
contract or tort law.
41
  
This does not mean that private remedies for breaches of norms in the single rulebook are, or are 
likely to become, ubiquitous. As already mentioned, a growing body of rules in secondary European 
legislation provide explicitly for private actions (including class actions). The trend, however, is less 
pronounced in relation to financial services, and particularly weak in the field of banking. Even in the 
area of securities regulation, where the link between regulatory intervention and protection of 
individual rights is much closer than in prudential regulation, European legislation only rarely makes 
explicit provision for private remedies.
42
 At the national level too, the matter remains controversial, 
                                                     
36
 Directive 2014/104/EU, OJ 2014 L 349/1. See Hüschelrath and Schweitzer (2014).  
37
 As in the case of intellectual property law, Directive 2004/48/EC, OJ 2004 L 195/16.  
38
 Prior to the enactment of Directive 2014/104/EU, the availability of damages for violations of EU antitrust rules had been 
recognised judicially, Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paras. 24, 26, 36. 
39
 As in the case law discussed in Della Negra (2014). Cf. Cherednychenko (2014b); Cherednychenko (2015).  
40
 The regulatory rules may thus turn into ‘maximum standards of protection’ in private law; Cherednychenko (2014b), at 
pp 671–674.  
41
 E.g., Directive 2009/65/EC, OJ 2009 L 302/32 (UCITSs IV Directive), Art. 79(2) (even though it is rather unlikely that 
national laws might recognise liability in the excluded circumstances).  
42
 Moloney (2014b), at pp 414-415, 950-951, 968-70. For exceptions, see Directive 2003/71/EC, OJ 2003 L 345/64 
(Prospectus Directive), Art. 6(2); Directive 2004/109/EC, OJ 2004 L 390/38 (Transparency Directive), Art. 7; Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009, OJ 2009 L 302/1 (Credit Rating Agencies Regulation), as amended, Art. 35a. A harmonised liability 
regime in favour of retail clients for breaches by investment service providers (including banks) of conduct-of-business 
rules was proposed at one point, but eventually failed to find its way into MiFID II. Nonetheless, MiFID II, Art. 69(2), 
third sub-para., provides that ‘Member States shall ensure that mechanisms are in place to ensure that compensation may 
be paid or other remedial action be taken in accordance with national law for any financial loss or damage suffered as a 
result of an infringement of [the investment services regime]’.  
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with the liability regime varying widely across countries.
43
 A similar situation pertains in relation to 
classic retail banking activities, such as consumer and mortgage credit, where the applicable directives 
fail to specify the private-law consequences of infringements of their norms.
44
 The provision of 
payment services stands apart, since the relevant Directive includes numerous liability rules.
45
 On the 
other hand, the creation of effective mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution for retail users of 
financial services is a recurring theme of directives in both the securities
46
 and the banking field.
47
 
This reflects the European legislators’ concern for the development of practical and cost-efficient 
remedies in areas where recourse to the courts is an inconvenient solution for most aggrieved persons. 
However, the insistence on dispute resolution mechanisms presupposes that retail clients can actually 
have valid private claims; it should thus be seen as an implicit expression of a legislative intention to 
create rights of action for breach of the directives’ protective norms.  
In these transactional areas, where protecting clients is a central concern, the dearth of European 
provisions on private remedies is probably due less to a lack of appreciation of the benefits of civil 
liability for the quality of the intended protection than to the grave difficulties inherent in the attempt 
to harmonise the national liability regimes. The complexities and potential unintended consequences 
of the harmonisation exercise are reinforced by a reluctance to inflict local and piecemeal changes on 
the supposedly coherent structures of national private laws. On the other hand, the possibility of 
alignment of the public with the private duties and remedies at the national level is left intact. Thus, 
rather than suggesting a radical divergence of the two branches of law, the absence of European norms 
on civil liability may point to the need for decentralised translation of the substantive regulatory 
requirements into the local idiom of private law.  
The matter takes on a different complexion when we turn to prudential regulation – the core 
subject of the single rulebook and the primary concern of the Banking Union. Here, there is a 
complete absence of European provisions on civil liability for regulatory infractions.
48
 The situation is 
not much different at the national level. This lack of private remedies almost certainly reflects the 
belief that the objectives of the prudential regime are of a purely public character as well as that 
private litigation is inherently unsuitable as an enforcement tool in this area (a topic to which we will 
return in Section 5).  
4. Public Goals and Private Obligations  
The goals of the Banking Union are examined carefully in Grundmann’s essay. It is asked, in 
particular, whether these diverge fundamentally from the goals of private law, so as to preclude the 
conversion of the Banking Union’s norms into obligations of private law. Although Grundmann sees 
areas of convergence, it is interesting that he poses the question at all. Are goals truly critical to the 
issue in hand?  
                                                     
43
 See Veil (2010), at pp 417-421.  
44
 The Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 23, provides for ‘penalties’, thus envisaging an administrative system of 
enforcement, possibly supported by criminal penalties, but the term cannot include civil actions. More recently, the 
Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 38, requires the establishment of ‘sanctions’, but is silent about the form that these 
should take.  
45
 Payment Services Directive.  
46
 MiFID II, Art. 75(1).  
47
 Payment Services Directive, Art. 83(1); Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 24(1); Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 39(1).  
48
 Unusually, however, the Credit Rating Agencies Regulation – an instrument which, though not concerning credit 
institutions, was undoubtedly adopted for reasons of a prudential-systemic nature – includes a special civil liability 
regime in favour of investors and issuers who have suffered damage as a result of a credit rating agency’s infringement of 
particular regulatory requirements, Credit Rating Agencies Regulation, as amended, Art. 35a.  
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The description of the goals of legal provisions as private or public is not uncommon, but it should 
be doubted whether it can be determinative of the relationship between public and private obligations. 
The public-private distinction itself is highly problematic:
49
 its nature and criteria,
50
 its historically 
contingent character,
51
 and its malleability and possible collapse
52
 are topics of perennial debate. In 
European law, especially, the boundaries between the public and the private sphere vary, depending on 
the issue;
53
 and no attempt is made to classify measures in two separate branches. At the national level 
too, where the general distinction is upheld at both the procedural and the substantive level, it would 
be hardly plausible to maintain that the private law’s distinctiveness is linked to the supposedly 
fundamental and inalterable nature of its goals. The province of private law was once identified with 
principles of formal equality, private autonomy and individual responsibility, as reflected in property 
rights, the free negotiation and strict enforcement of contracts and a generally free market; but today a 
large part of the scholarship emphasises notions of social responsibility, the law’s role in balancing 
and regulating competing private interests and the need to protect the weaker parties in transactions. 
The preponderance of standard contracts and multilateral, network contractual relationships in modern 
practice, as well as the increasing awareness of the external effects of inter partes transacting, have 
also helped to introduce regulatory elements and public concerns into the very fabric of private law.  
Occasionally, the continuing autonomy of national private law in relation to regulatory norms of 
European provenance is defended on the theory that a purely regulatory approach with public 
objectives may only provide an unvarying minimum level of individual protection, while the general 
standards of private laws can always be individuated and recalibrated ex post, in an attempt to achieve 
corrective justice and equity.
54
 The argument assumes that, compared to regulatory law, traditional 
private law will tend to confer more complete protection on individual parties. However, it is by no 
means clear that all national systems of private law actually operate (nor that they should operate) in 
this manner to serve the interests of apparently weak parties. If anything, private law is internally 
conflicted. There are strong tensions between competing values of individualism and solidarity, legal 
certainty and ex post equity, formalism and open-ended standards,
55
 which are resolved differently 
from country to country and time to time. Moreover, it is not self-evident that the separate evaluation 
of the same factual situation would result in a higher level of protection in private than in regulatory 
law. In fact, the opposite is highly likely, if, for instance, new types of protection introduced by 
European legislation are not given cognisance in national private law, because they cannot be brought 
under accepted headings of civil liability. The example of competition law may again serve as an 
example; but the same may apply to regulatory duties relating to banking transactions (for instance, 
consumer credit or mortgage contracts) or to certain conduct-of-business rules in securities regulation, 
whose breach is now subject to administrative sanctions, but may not necessarily provide a good basis 
for contractual or delictual professional liability. If so, bringing national private law in line with the 
new regulatory norms will actually increase the level of protection afforded to the users of financial 
services.  
One should also consider an additional scenario, entailing the deliberate creation on the part of the 
legislator of novel civil rights of action for breach of regulatory duties, in a purely instrumental 
attempt to enlist private law in the service of regulatory objectives. One could object that this is an 
adulteration of private law and a violation of its integrity, but the possibility certainly exists. A well-
                                                     
49
 E.g., Freedland and Auby (2006).  
50
 E.g., Barnett (1986).  
51
 E.g., Merryman (1968); Horwitz (1982).  
52
 E.g., Kennedy (1982).  
53
 See Sauter and Schepel (2009).  
54
 See, e.g., Cherednychenko (2014a), at pp 490-491; and, in more nuanced terms, Marjosola (2014), at pp 566-570.  
55
 Cf. Kennedy (1976).  
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established line of analysis addresses enforcement precisely in this manner, turning the remedies of 
administrative, private and criminal law into substitutable means for pursuing the legal system’s 
various objectives (all of which are deemed to be, in one or another sense, ‘public’, just as the legal 
system itself is public).
56
 On this view, enforcement tools should be chosen depending on their relative 
effectiveness and efficiency in bringing about the desired goal. Thus, the availability of civil liability 
and private rights of action may be accepted, either as a substitute for administrative or criminal 
enforcement or in parallel with them, purely on grounds of optimal enforcement. Clearly, there are 
inherent limits, since the various elements of a private action (theories of liability, norms of 
actionability or standing, intra partes procedure, evidential norms and standards of proof, principles of 
causation, forms and limits of the remedies) cannot be modified without affecting the quality and 
integrity of the adjudicative process
57
 and its private and social costs. These practical limits, however, 
have little to do with the public nature of the regulatory goals, since the latter could easily dovetail 
with, and utilise, the narrow private interests that the availability of a civil right of action would 
incentivise to come forward.  
In any event, the nature of the goals cannot erect a barrier to the private enforcement of regulatory 
norms if this is required by European legislation or by a national legislative instrument. In contrast, the 
question of goals becomes highly important in relation to the judicial recognition of private effect. It is 
well known that a putative legislative intention to protect private interests or to confer rights on 
individuals is a critical parameter in deciding whether the breach of a European norm (or, in the case 
of a directive, its non- or incorrect implementation) is actionable or not. This consideration is applied 
by the CJEU when deciding on a norm’s pan-European effect,58 as well as by the national courts, when 
considering liabilities from the residual prism of domestic private law.  
In this context, the protective aim of each regulatory norm must be examined separately. However, 
Grundmann rightly points out that the goals animating the Banking Union project (including the 
reintegration of the euro area’s banking markets, an exit from the vicious circle between financially 
weak banks and fiscally weak sovereigns, and the severance of links between regulators, politicians 
and banking interests at the national level
59
) cannot easily justify a reading of the relevant instruments 
as aiming at the protection of particular private interests. In his reading, the only goal which converges 
with those of private law is that of improving the supervision of cross-border banking groups by 
decisively applying a one-entity approach. Even the latter, however, cannot easily be converted into 
specific private obligations.  
For Grundmann, the Banking Union’s emphasis on public goals is one more example of the 
fundamentally instrumental character of European law, whose overriding objective is integration, and 
accordingly, of its limited ability to take into account individual private parties, pay due respect to 
their autonomy and their rights and properly balance their interests. It must be wondered whether 
integration is indeed a goal of ‘public law’ or a constitutive aspiration of the European project, which 
transcends the public law-private law divide. Paradoxically (if one subscribes to the view that 
integration is a goal of public law), according to the jurisprudence of the CJEU,
60
 private rights of 
action must be recognised in relation to the breach of certain European norms, because this ensures 
their effectiveness (a concept serving precisely the purpose of integration). The principle of 
effectiveness can thus provide an independent basis for actionability.  
                                                     
56
 See, e.g., Becker and Stigler (1974); Landes and Posner (1974); Shavell (1993); and, specifically in relation to the 
enforcement of financial (securities) regulation, Jackson and Roe (2009).  
57
 Cf. Fuller 1978.  
58
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich et al. [1991] ECR 1-5357, para. 39; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl 
[1994] ECR I-3325, para. 27.  
59
 SSM Regulation, Rec. 2-6.  
60
 See Case C-453/99 Courage, para. 20.  
The Banking Union and Its Implications for Private Law: A Comment 
9 
In the past, effectiveness had only marginal practical implications in this direction; but this may be 
due to the legal form of the applicable European instruments, which were preponderantly directives. 
Directives cannot have full horizontal direct effect,
61
 while the obligation of the Member States to 
transpose their norms with full effect tends to be limited to the establishment at the national level of 
the prescribed mechanisms of enforcement. Accordingly, where a directive does not require that civil 
remedies be available, the private-law consequences of an infraction are determined primarily by the 
internal legal order of each Member State.
62
 As recently suggested by Tountopoulos,
63
 however, the 
situation may be different if the measures are in the form of regulations – an increasingly common 
occurrence in European financial law: in the eyes of the CJEU, the uniform and effective enforcement 
of such fully unified norms may justify a more interventionist approach, including the recognition of 
private enforcement rights in appropriate cases.
64
 Still, one should probably not expect dramatic 
developments in this direction. The components of the single rulebook whose subject matter makes 
them particularly suitable for private enforcement (that is, those containing harmonised transactional 
or conduct-of-business rules) are precisely those which retain the form of directives and whose 
enforcement is still left to a variety of national authorities, operating outside the SSM framework. 
Their lack of direct effect could thus combine with the principle of procedural autonomy of the 
Member States to impede a pan-European recognition of private rights of action by the CJEU.  
5. Areas of Interaction  
In his paper, Grundman identifies three areas of private law which can be strongly affected by the 
Banking Union: banks’ corporate governance, resolution, and client relationships. It is worth 
examining briefly in what ways the regulatory norms may affect private law in each of these areas and 
elsewhere.  
There can be no doubt that the business organisation and internal relations of banks are affected 
directly and profoundly by the post-crisis regulatory framework in a way unknown in the past. Then, 
prudential regulation was almost exclusively focused on the observance of a single capital adequacy 
ratio. Undoubtedly, the measurement methodology affected the relative cost faced by the banks when 
undertaking different types of transactions, and thus incentivised particular financial behaviours. But 
the banks’ internal organisation and decision-making used to be largely unaffected by the regulatory 
system.
65
 This ‘black-box’ approach has now been abandoned, and the prudential regime is 
increasingly concerned with internal governance. Alongside a much more complex and intrusive 
system of financial controls, the new regulatory arrangements cover a host of corporate matters, 
including banks’ corporate governance, directors’ and managers’ duties, directors’ remuneration, 
business plans and strategies, internal risk management practices, or even the structure of cross-border 
banking groups.
66
 The introduction of structural controls, involving the separation of certain 
potentially risky trading activities from banks’ deposit-taking business, is also under consideration. In 
all these respects, regulatory law is superimposed on the private law of business organisation and 
limits the freedom of choice of banks and their stakeholders. Talking here of a ‘translation’ would be 
                                                     
61
 Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori, para. 20. 
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 Case C-604/11 Genil 48 SL, Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos SL v Bankinter SA, Banco Bilbao Vizca Argentaria 
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 See Binder (2015).  
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deceptive: rather than being translated into private law, regulatory law simply takes over from it. Nor 
is the role of private enforcement likely to be significant in ensuring compliance with the new norms.  
The regulatory regime’s invasion of the field formerly occupied by private law is even more 
pronounced in relation to bank insolvency, where the BRRD’s new resolution regime replaces 
altogether the procedures and criteria of general insolvency law, transfers the decision-making 
responsibility fully to the hands of administrative bodies and away from the courts, and gives primacy 
to the preservation of financial stability and the continuity of the banking intermediation function over 
the traditional evaluations and practices of insolvency law. In this area, the substantive claims and 
procedural rights of individual stakeholders must be reconceptualised within the parameters of the new 
regime in which they are absorbed.  
Of course, one can still envisage specific factual situations where the breach of the regulatory 
norms would open the road to new forms of purely private claims. For instance, if a manager’s 
contract of employment provides for remuneration in excess of what would be permissible under the 
CRD IV and its implementing legislation, the relevant clause may be invalid as contrary to a 
mandatory rule of law. Again, the regulatory environment may determine the standard of performance 
expected of a bank’s staff in the private setting; thus, the failure of an officer to ensure compliance 
with the bank’s regulatory obligations within his personal field of responsibility may justify his 
dismissal for cause or even, depending on the circumstances, give rise to a compensation claim.  
More interesting than such incidental private effects is the question of direct civil liability of the 
bank and/or its directors and officers for breaches of prudential requirements per se. Traditionally, 
private litigation has been scarcely in evidence in the field of prudential regulation, and for good 
reason: over and above the aforementioned objection of principle relating to the system’s exclusively 
public character, an attempt to apply normal principles of civil liability to a breach of the regulatory 
requirements would stumble on almost insurmountable practical problems. Most prudential norms are 
inherently unsuitable for compensatory claims, because in a pre-insolvency context their violation 
does not lead to direct and quantifiable harm, much less to damage to specific parties, but merely to a 
general weakening of the relevant institution’s overall resilience.67 Moreover, potential infringements 
are not easily observable. In combination, the lack of suitable plaintiffs, the evidential problems, the 
near impossibility of causally linking the infringements to specific and quantifiable losses (at least 
when the threshold of insolvency has not yet been crossed), all these and other technical factors 
suggest that, in general, damages are not an effective or appropriate means for the enforcement of 
prudential regulations. It is highly improbable that this will somehow change as a result of the 
Banking Union or of the new prudential norms in the CRD IV/CRR package.  
However, it is not totally inconceivable that a special regime of civil liability might be introduced 
legislatively, for reasons of public policy.
 
In order to be effective, such a system would need to 
substantially modify the traditional concepts and principles of civil liability. Europe might thus follow 
the US, with its long history of private enforcement of public regulatory statutes, based on modified 
liability rules and enhanced damages.
68
 Indeed, American law already includes special provisions on 
the personal professional liability of directors who caused their bank’s failure. It should be noted, 
however, that this is not a case of truly private enforcement: the civil claim can only be brought in the 
form of a derivative action by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the failed 
bank.
69
 Remarkably, similar types of insolvency-linked professional liability may soon gain currency 
                                                     
67
 Theoretically, however, a bank in breach of prudential requirements could be pursued by competitors, or by stakeholders 
such as depositors, seeking injunctive or declaratory relief or specific performance; cf. Case C-253/00, Muñoz and 
Superior Fruiticola v Frumar and Redbridge [2002] ECR I-7289. This type of action would avoid some of the problems 
in relation to actions for damages, but would not provide meaningful incentives for potential plaintiffs and would in all 
likelihood be totally insignificant in terms of improving compliance with the rules.  
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in Europe, since one of the general principles governing the recently introduced resolution regime is 
the imposition in national law of civil or criminal liability on the natural and legal persons responsible 
for the failure of a credit institution.
70
 This development would not represent a dramatic innovation, 
however, because it bears similarities with existing rules of the general insolvency law of certain 
European countries, such as the wrongful trading provision of UK law.
71
  
Some authors propose going further than that, by creating special duties, standards of care and 
attendant liability regimes for key decision-makers (depending on the proposal, directors, senior 
managers and/or controlling shareholders) of all banks, or of systemically important ones, including 
when these are still going concerns.
72
 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that, whatever one’s 
view on the merits of such proposals, the relevant theories of liability diverge extensively from the 
general law in terms of the identity of affected persons, their duties, the standards of proof and 
causation and/or the feasible remedies. They are thus unsuitable for judicial endorsement through the 
reinterpretation and individuation of the usual standards of civil liability; their adoption would almost 
certainly require explicit legislative intervention.  
One area where the Banking Union is bound to lead to the development of the principles of private 
law at European level is that of state liability for faulty regulatory decisions. The fact that 
supranational institutions such as the ECB and the SRB (and, to a lesser extent, the EBA) are now 
directly responsible for front-line supervisory decision-making means that the resolution of grievances 
and the fate of civil claims can no longer be seen as a matter of national law. In this context, one must 
distinguish between, on the one hand, actions by third parties, such as depositors, who have suffered 
loss as a result of the failure of a credit institution and seek to recover their loss by turning against the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities on the theory that, if the latter had properly performed their 
responsibilities, the loss would have been avoided, and, on the other hand, actions by regulated 
institutions and/or their individual controllers, directors or staff, who may be directly harmed by a 
negative supervisory decision or action.  
Significantly, as a result of the Europeanisation of the prudential regulatory regime, claims of the 
first category are less likely to succeed in the future. Indeed, the test of the regulatory norm’s 
protective intent is likely to constitute a strong barrier to their claims. The test has already been 
applied by the ECJ to the supervision of credit institutions in the Paul case.
73
 Decided in the context of 
the pre-SSM system, whereby supervisory responsibilities were allocated to the national competent 
authorities on a home-country basis, the case is authority for the principle that the European norms 
relating to prudential regulation are not intended to protect depositors or creditors individually, but the 
banking system at large. The protection that individual depositors must enjoy as a matter of European 
law is limited to the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes covering deposits at least up to the 
prescribed level; if a Member State has provided for the mandatory participation of credit institutions 
in a national scheme meeting the pan-European requirements, it will then be free to decide that the 
ongoing supervision of credit institutions is carried on only in the public interest and to deny 
individual claims for compensation for damage resulting from any supervisory failures.
74
 At its time, 
the decision left open the possibility of a more ‘generous’ treatment of complainants in national law. 
However, the centralisation of prudential supervision in the Banking Union precludes divergent 
national interpretations regarding the nature of the supervisory responsibility of the competent 
authorities and, in particular, of the ECB. In this sense, irrespectively of any statutory immunity in 
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their favour, the new supranational supervisors may find protection in the Paul ruling against actions 
in damages based simply on the substandard performance of their duties, even where this is due to 
gross negligence or faute lourde.
75
  
In contrast, the second category of potential claims cannot be foreclosed on grounds of principle. 
The civil liability of European institutions and bodies for illegal and harmful actions is well founded in 
the Treaties; 
76
 and the expansion of their jurisdiction in areas that are intrinsically linked to the 
personal interests of regulated persons will unavoidably generate factual situations where individual 
harm will be claimed and the conditions of liability will need to be defined.  
One should, finally, consider the implications of the Banking Union for wholesale banking markets 
and practices. Much has already been said about the norms in the single rulebook concerning banking 
transactions and relations with (retail) clients and the ways in which such norms can be recognised in 
private law too. But wholesale transactions may be affected in a different manner by the Banking 
Union. The EBA’s elaboration of the prudential rules and the ECB’s supervisory interventions may be 
more important in this context than the various directives’ consumerist norms. The multilateral 
character of inter-professional market-based transacting reduces the significance of decentralised 
contracting and litigation for the development of commercial practice, while increasing that of market-
wide standardisation. The latter, however, is critically influenced by the financial institutions’ 
collective interaction with the public authorities, their cooperation and mutual adaptation. Moreover, 
the shifting regulatory environment constitutes part of the financial and risk parameters within which 
market practice develops. Accordingly, as critically but less directly than in relation to banks’ 
corporate governance, the official stance on prudential questions can exercise a very powerful shaping 
influence on the development of the standard market practice (including in relation to 
collateralisation), the standard documentation used by transacting parties and, potentially, the network 
contracts which underpin certain infrastructures.  
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